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VI. — *On the Distinction between the Subjunctive and Optative Modes in Greek Conditional Sentences.*

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IN a discussion at the session of the Association last year upon the use of the subjunctive mode in Greek conditional sentences, it was maintained on the one hand, that the difference between the subjunctive and optative in these sentences was only that of more or less vivid presentation, that is, a difference of degree; on the other, that it was the difference of supposed fact as contingent and supposed fact as merely conceived, that is, a difference in kind. It is the object of this paper briefly to discuss this point.

If we turn to the four classes of particular suppositions in Greek conditional sentences,* and ask how the fact of supposition is presented in each case, the answer, I think, will be somewhat as follows.

In a conditional sentence of the first class, having in the condition *εἰ* with a present or past tense of the indicative, and in the conclusion the indicative without *ἄν*, or a verb of commanding, exhorting, or wishing, there is a simple supposition relating to the actual state of the case, to reality : e. g. DEM. Phil. i. 29, *εἰ δέ τις οἶεται μικρὰν ἀφορμὴν εἶναι σιτηρέσιον τοῖς στρατευομένοις ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκεν*, 'if any one thinks it to be a small start for the soldiers to begin with ration-money, he is wrong.' The condition, *εἰ δέ τις οἶεται*, 'if any one thinks, or is thinking,' is question of what really is, a supposition relating to actual fact. No implication that the fact supposed is or is not actual is involved. DEM. Phil. i. 38, *εἰ δ' ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*, 'if agreeableness of speech proves a harm to deed, it is a shame,' etc. Is it the fact? It either is or is not. The supposition relates clearly to actual fact. XEN. Mem. ii. 1. 28, *ἀλλ' εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἴλεως εἶναι σοὶ βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς*, 'if

* Goodwin's Greek Modes and Tenses, § 48.

you wish the gods to be propitious, you must serve the gods.' 'If you wish.' Do you wish or do you not? It is question of actual fact. THUC. ii. 45. 3, εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς μνησθῆναι, βραχεία παρανέσει ἅπαν σῆμανῶ, 'If it is needful at all for me to make mention, etc., I will declare all in a brief exhortation.' DEM. Cor. 52, εἰ δ' ἀπιστεῖς, ἐρώτησον αὐτούς, 'if you disbelieve, ask them.'

It would seem, then, that if we were to characterize a condition of the first class from the manner of its presenting the fact in supposition, we might call it a supposition relating to actual fact, generally implying nothing as to its existence in reality one way or the other, though sometimes assuming or taking it for granted.

In the second class, having in the condition εἰ with a secondary tense of the indicative, in the conclusion ἄν with also a secondary tense of the indicative, we have plainly a supposition implying the contrary to be the fact: e. g. DEM. Phil. i. 1, εἰ μὲν περὶ καιροῦ τινὸς πράγματος προϋτίθετο λέγειν, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἤγον. 'if it were proposed to treat of any new subject, I should keep silence,' implying plainly that it is not proposed to treat of any new subject, and therefore he does not keep silence. Id. ib. 5, εἰ ταῖνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν, 'if then Philip at that time had entertained this opinion, he would have done none of those things which he now has done,' implying that he did not entertain this opinion at that time, and therefore did do the things he has done. So always; and we may characterize a condition of the second class as a supposition implying the contrary to be the truth, or, for the sake of brevity, a supposition of contrary fact.

Passing for the time being the third class, having in the condition εἰ with the subjunctive, we have for the fourth class a conditional sentence with εἰ and the optative in the condition, and the optative with ἄν in the conclusion. An example is DEM. Phil. i. 25, εἰ γὰρ ἔροιτό τις ὑμᾶς, εἰρήνην ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; μὴ Δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς γε, εἰποῖτ' ἄν, 'for if any one should ask you, Are you at peace, O Athenians? No, by Zeus, we are not, you would say.' 'If any one should ask,

you would say.' The fact of the supposition here is presented merely as hypothetical, merely as conceived, without reference or implication in any way as regards actual fact. Nor is it future any farther than a supposition of fact not a reality now nor in the past must be in the future if at all. The verbs in the condition and conclusion. ἔροιτο, εἶποιτε, are both in the aorist, which means that the Greeks eliminated the facts of the supposition from the element of time and held them in the mind as mere conceptions, never having been, not now being, never to be, in reality, so far as this assertion is concerned. Again, PLAT. Phaed. 67 E, εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη; 'if they should fear and complain, would it not be very absurd?' Here, again, the fact of supposition is purely hypothetical, placed before the mind as a conception without any reference or implication in relation to reality, likewise not future except as in the previous case. So generally. The optative mode in the conditional sentence is the mode of possibility, that which might be, the mode of fact simply as conceived or existing as a conception in the mind. Accordingly we may characterize a condition of the fourth class as a supposition of conceived fact.

We return now to the conditional sentence of the third class, εἰάν with the subjunctive in the condition, and a principal tense of the indicative, commonly the future, or the imperative, in the conclusion. PLAT. Phaed. 69 D, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφές εἰσόμεθα, εἰάν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, 'when we shall have arrived there, we shall know the truth, if God wills.' What is the force of the subjunctive ἐθέλῃ here? It expresses an action continuous, uncertain, and future: 'if God be willing' at that time. The continuousness arises from the tense, which is present; the futurity partly from the tense of the principal clause expressing the fact, a future one, of which this is the condition, and partly from the mode, which, it seems to me, we may describe as the mode of uncertainty or contingency, that is, the mode by which the Greeks chose to represent an action as uncertain or contingent whether in reality it was so or not. The principal verb, εἰσόμεθα, expressly declares a fact, 'we shall know,' but it is contingent, and the

mode used to express that contingency is the subjunctive. What would be the force if the sentence were a conditional of the fourth class, that is, with the optative in both condition and conclusion, thus: *εἰδεῖμεν ἂν, εἰ θεὸς ἐθέλοι?* It seems plain that the assumed fact expressed by the words *ἐλθόντες ἐκεῖσε*, 'when we shall have arrived there' (into the future state), would be thrown back from an assumed fact into a simply conceived fact of condition, 'if we should arrive there,' and then the conclusion also would be thrown back into a simply conceived fact, 'we should know,' and the present condition, as expressing only uncertainty, would become a second condition, likewise of simply conceived fact, 'if God should will.' That is, the sentence in the first form positively declares a fact with a condition of mere contingency; in the second, it presents the fact merely as a conception and its conditions also as conceived facts. The difference therefore is not one of degree, more or less vividness, but of *kind*, mere uncertainty or contingency on the one hand, and pure conception on the other. DEM. Phil. i. 29, *τοῦτ' ἂν γένηται, προσποριεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ αὐτὸ τὸ σπράτευμα ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου*, 'should this be done, the army itself will provide the remainder from the war.' What, again, is the force of the subjunctive here? *τοῦτ' ἂν γένηται*, 'should this be done,' 'if this shall have been done.' Is it not plainly question of fact which is uncertain, contingent, and not presented to the mind as a mere conception? If Demosthenes had said *εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, προσπορίζοι ἂν τὰ λοιπὰ, κ.τ.λ.*, would he not have meant 'if this should take place, the army itself would provide the remainder,' etc., presenting the fact merely as a conception in the mind? And is there not plainly here a distinction in kind—fact in the first place as contingent, in the second as purely hypothetical—and not of degree, as more or less vivid? THUC. ii. 39. 4, *ἦν δέ· που μορίῳ τινὶ προσμίξωσι, κρατήσαντές τε τινὰς ἡμῶν πάντας ἀνχοῦσιν ἀπεῶσθαι*, 'if ever they have had an engagement with any small portion of our army, having conquered some, they boast that we all have been driven.' *Ἦν προσμίξωσι*, 'if they may have engaged.' What is the force of this subjunctive? It is an aorist—an action

‘brought to pass.’ It is in the past, not future. There is nothing future about it. It is not the positive declaration of an act as a positive fact. The speaker, rather, most evidently wished to present the case as an *uncertainty*. It may have taken place and it may not, so far as he asserts. He wishes not to say that it has, but to grant that it may have, and to leave his hearer to believe rather that it has. It is the assertion in supposition of uncertain fact.

The last example is a general supposition,* and perhaps better illustrates the nature of the subjunctive mode than the third class particular. We will take another. EURIP. Alc. 671, ἤν δ’ ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνήσκειν, ‘if ever death comes near, no one wishes to die.’ Here also is an aorist subjunctive in the condition, ἔλθῃ — aorist to signify that the fact is viewed as one ‘brought to pass,’ done and complete in itself whatever the time be, past, present, or future, and subjunctive to represent the fact as an uncertain one, ‘if death may have come near.’ This is a general supposition of the first class, denoting a general fact now true, and it is easy to see why the Greeks should have used the mode of uncertainty — the subjunctive — in the hypothesis, since the fact may or may not be at any given time, while they would use the mode of pure hypothesis, of mere conception — the optative — in a general supposition of the second class, where the case supposed is in past time. Compare, for example,

ἐάν τις τοίτου πίῃ, ἀποθνήσκει, and
εἰ τις τούτου πίῃ, ἀπέθνησκεν.

The first makes hypothesis of a fact which *may take place now*; the second, of a fact which possibly took place, which may be conceived of only as taking place, in past time.

The same may be seen equally well in conditional relative sentences. Compare

ὃ τι ἂν βούληται, δώσω, *I will give him whatever he may wish*, and
ὃ τι βούλοιτο, δοίην ἂν, *I should give him whatever he might wish*.

My conclusion then is, that the subjunctive in conditional sentences differs from the optative in that it is a form of the verb to represent the fact as uncertain, or, in general,

* Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, § 51.

contingent, while the optative is a form to represent it as merely conceived; and the difference between them is one not of degree, but of kind. And in accordance with what has been said, the four classes of conditional sentences particular may properly be described, viewing them with reference to the manner in which the fact of supposition is presented, the first, *εἰ* with the indicative, usually a primary tense, as a supposition relating to actual fact; the second, *εἰ* with the indicative, secondary tense, as a supposition relating to contrary fact, or implying that the contrary is the truth; the third, *ἐάν* with the subjunctive, as a supposition relating to contingent fact; and the fourth, *εἰ* with the optative, as a supposition of conceived fact.

VII. — *On the Age of Xenophon at the Time of the Anabasis.*

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THE biographies of Xenophon represent that he was born in B. C. 444 or 443, and that he was in consequence forty-three or forty-two years old at the time he joined the expedition of Cyrus. So far as I have been able to examine the current authorities, I do not find any who do not give their adhesion to this view. The life of Xenophon prefixed to the edition of Prof. Anthon, which is mainly taken from that in the Penny Cyclopaedia, that in the edition of Prof. Boise, that prefixed to Kühner's edition, and that in Smith's Dictionary of Biography, are unanimous on this point. These all acknowledge their obligations to a tract of C. G. Krüger, published at Halle in 1822, entitled "*De Xenophontis Vita Quaestiones Criticae*," which I have unfortunately been unable to procure or even to get a sight of, and I can in consequence deal with it only at second hand.* Sir G. C.

* Since this paper was read, Mr. A. Van Name, Librarian of Yale College, kindly sent me a volume containing a number of Krüger's philological papers, and among them this discussion of Xenophon's age. I find that the "lives" above referred to have extracted all that is of weight in it, and the perusal of it has not led me to alter my own opinion in any degree.